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Abstract: The self-sufficiency hypothesis suggests that priming individuals with money makes them focus more strongly on themselves than
on others. However, recently, research supporting this claim has been heavily criticized and some attempts to replicate have failed. A reason
for the inconsistent findings in the field may lay in the common use of explicit measures, because they tend to rely on one or just a few items
and are thus prone to demand effects and low reliability. In the present research, we administered, in two experiments, the imitation-inhibition
task – a robust, unobtrusive, and reliable paradigm that is sensitive to self-other focus on a trial-by-trial basis. A pilot study found an
increased focus on the self as compared to others when primed with money. Building on this finding, a preregistered high-powered experiment
replicated this effect, suggesting that money primes may indeed increase a focus on the self. An additionally carried out meta-analysis
indicates that automatic imitation is modulated by self-other focus and that money primes lead to a smaller focus on the self than
conventional methods. Overall, the found effects are rather small and several limitations, such as order effects, call for a cautious
interpretation of the findings.
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Based on seminal findings in the domain of money priming,
Vohs, Mead, and Goode (2006) introduced more than a
decade ago the self-sufficiency hypothesis, according to
which people who are reminded of money evaluate options
and actions in terms of personal inputs and outputs. This
general market pricing orientation (Fiske, 1991) is accompa-
nied by an inner state of self-sufficiency “wherein people put
forth effort to attain personal goals and prefer to be sepa-
rate from others” (Vohs et al., 2006, p. 1154). As a conse-
quence, people focus more strongly on self-related needs
and less on the needs of others (Mok & De Cremer,
2018; Reutner & Wänke, 2013; Schuler & Wänke, 2016;
Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2008).
A series of findings supports the theoretical consideration
that priming people with money increases a focus on the
self (e.g., Gasiorowska, Zaleskiewicz, & Wygrab, 2012;
Vohs et al., 2006; for a review see Vohs, 2015). For exam-
ple, when being primed with money, participants show an
increased focus on one’s own benefits and goals
(Gąsiorowska & Hełka, 2012; Reutner & Wänke, 2013;
Teng, Chen, Poon, Zhang, & Jiang, 2016) and put more
emphasis on the achievement of personal tasks (Boucher
& Kofos, 2012; Zedelius, Veling, & Aarts, 2013). Likewise,
it has been found that subjects reminded of money are less
inclined to interact with others (Vohs et al., 2006), to help
others (e.g., Guéguen & Jacob, 2013; Vohs et al., 2006) and
to consider other persons’ needs (Gino & Mogilner, 2014;
Kouchaki, Smith-Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013).
Despite the support for the idea that money priming
results in a focus on the self, such research has recently
undergone heavy criticism.More specifically, several money
priming studies did not replicate as expected (Klein et al.,
2014; Rohrer, Pashler, & Harris, 2015; Schuler & Wänke,
2016) and two articles were suspected (one convicted) of
data fraud (for details, see Pashler, Rohrer, Abramson,
Wolfson, & Harris, 2016). Even more concerning, a
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meta-analysis by Vadillo, Hardwicke, and Shanks (2016)
suggests that the seminal findings on money priming that
inspired the entire field (i.e., Vohs et al., 2006) might have
been biased by selective reporting and other questionable
research practices (see also Lodder, Ong, Grasman, &
Wicherts, 2019). Moreover, in a recent effort to shed light
onto these mixed effects, Caruso, Shapira, and Landy
(2017) investigated, across three high-powered studies
(N = 4,649), the degree to which different money priming
manipulations affect different self-other focus related self-
reports. The results indicated that the effects of money
priming are rather weak and inconsistent across measures
and studies.
Together, these research findings raise the question why
money priming manipulations produce such inconsistent
findings. A possible answer may lay in the used methods.
That is, previous research on money priming has mostly
assessed behavioral measures based on one or just a few
items, which is known to result in low reliability (cf. Epstein,
1980). Moreover, most studies used explicit self-reports
that may be prone to demand effects (e.g., Schwarz,
1999). Finally, in many studies there was a time delay
between the prime and the dependent variable, which
may reduce the strength of the effect (e.g., Hermans, De
Houwer, & Eelen, 2001; Hermans, Spruyt, & Eelen, 2003).
These shortcomings in measuring the effects of money
priming call for a new methodological approach. Therefore,
in the present research we aimed to test the core assump-
tion underlying the self-sufficiency hypothesis (i.e., money
primes lead to an increased focus on the self; Vohs et al.,
2006) with a highly reliable task that has been demon-
strated to be sensitive to self-other focus and is rather
unobtrusive. Moreover, we integrated the money primes
within each trial to strengthen the effect of the manipula-
tion. A promising task that allows for all these characteris-
tics is the imitation-inhibition task (Brass, Bekkering,
Wohlschläger, & Prinz, 2000; Stürmer, Aschersleben, &
Prinz, 2000), which is typically used in the study of auto-
matic imitation (for a meta-analysis see Cracco, Bardi,
et al., 2018).
Automatic Imitation
Individuals imitate a wide range of different behaviors
including postures (LaFrance, 1982), gestures (Cracco,
Genschow, Radkova, & Brass, 2018), or simple movements
(Genschow & Florack, 2014; Genschow, Florack, & Wänke,
2013; Genschow & Schindler, 2016). According to
ideomotor theory (e.g., Greenwald, 1970; Prinz, 1990,
1997), such imitative tendencies are the result of shared
perception-action codes that cause observed actions to be
represented in the same format as executed actions. These
shared representations provide a common ground for
information on the self and others, suggesting an intrinsic
overlap between self and other in the brain (e.g., Lamm,
Bukowski, & Silani, 2016).
The most prominent task in the domain of automatic imi-
tation is the imitation-inhibition task (Brass, Bekkering, &
Prinz, 2001; Brass et al., 2000). In this task, participants
respond, across many trials, to symbolic stimuli by lifting
1 of 2 fingers. For example, participants have to lift their
index finger in response to the number “1” and their middle
finger in response to the number “2”. Together with the
presentation of the number on the screen, participants
see another person’s hand either lifting the same finger
(congruent trial) or the other finger (incongruent trial). Past
research has shown that congruent finger lifting move-
ments speed up responses and incongruent finger lifting
movements slow down responses (Brass et al., 2001,
2000). The difference in response speed between incon-
gruent and congruent trials is the imitation-inhibition
congruency effect, which reflects the degree of confusion
between internal and external action plans and as such
can be seen as a measure of self-other focus (Brass, Ruby,
& Spengler, 2009).
Indeed, research has shown that an increased focus on
the self as compared to others reduces the congruency effect
(Cracco, Clauwaert, Van den Broeck, Van Damme, & Brass,
2019; Hogeveen & Obhi, 2011; Leighton, Bird, Orsini, &
Heyes, 2010; Spengler, Brass, Kühn, & Schütz-Bosbach,
2010; van Baaren, Maddux, Chartrand, De Bouter, & van
Knippenberg, 2003; Wang & Hamilton, 2013). For instance,
Hogeveen and Obhi (2011) primed participants with words
related to an interdependent self-construal or independent
self-construal and found smaller congruency effects during
independent as compared to interdependent primes.
Relatedly, Spengler and colleagues (2010) found reduced
congruency effects when increasing participants’ self-focus
by letting them sit in front of a mirror during the imitation-
inhibition task.
In sum, the imitation-inhibition task has been demon-
strated to be sensitive to self-other focus. Moreover, the
task is known to be reliable and robust. For example, in a
recent highly powered study (N = 196), Genschow et al.
(2017) found a split-half reliability of ρ* = .86. Moreover,
a recent meta-analysis on the imitation-inhibition task
yielded an effect size of gz = 1.03 for reaction times, indicat-
ing a very strong effect (Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018).
Present Research
The aim of the present research was to administer a robust,
unobtrusive and reliable paradigm that is sensitive to self-
other focus in order to test the influence of money priming
on self-focus. We applied the imitation-inhibition task and
hypothesized smaller congruency effects during trials that
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contain money primes as compared to control primes. We
first ran a pilot study. Based on the results of the pilot study
we adapted our paradigm and then ran a highly powered
preregistered experiment. Stimuli and data of both experi-
ments, and the preregistration of the preregistered experi-
ment are made open accessible at the Open Science
Framework (OSF) under the following link: https://osf.io/
ncvfs/?view_only=82162828bf194135b8bb63b483ed2870
Pilot Study
Method
Participants and Design
In return for partial course credit, 47 students from Ghent
University (Belgium) participated in this study. All partici-
pants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Prior
to analysis, we excluded five participants: Two participants
were excluded because the response box did not detect any
response and three participants were excluded because
they committed errors in more than 50% of the trials,
suggesting random responses. The final sample thus
contained 42 participants (12 males), with an age ranging
from 18 to 27 (M = 21.90; SD = 2.97). The design consisted
of a 2 (Congruency: congruent trials vs. incongruent trials)
 2 (Priming: money vs. control) within-subject design.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2001, 2000) was
programmed using Tscope5 software (Stevens, Lammertyn,
Verbruggen, & Vandierendonck, 2006) and was run on
Asus Eee PC 1215N laptops with an external 1700 Dell mon-
itor. Responses were recorded with a custom-built response
box, which uses light sensors to detect lifting movements of
participants’ index and middle fingers. Stimuli consisted of
different frames (523  422 pixels). The frames depicted a
female left hand that was positioned to create a mirror
image of the participant’s right hand (i.e., the response
hand). To produce an illusion of movement, the hand was
first presented in resting position and was then overwritten
by a second picture of the hand in the final position. The
final position depicted the model either having the index
finger or the middle finger lifted. Depending on condition,
the model’s hand was either lying on a bunch of money bills
(i.e., 100€, 20€, 10€ bills) or on paper sheets that con-
tained the exact same pixels as the money bills, but were
regrouped in random order.
Procedure
The pilot study was conducted at the end of a series of
other experiments. After participants signed a written
informed consent, the experimenter gave some general oral
instructions on the imitation-inhibition task. Participants
then ran through eight practice trials to get familiar with
the task. Afterward, participants performed two blocks of
the imitation-inhibition task. In one block participants saw
a hand lying on money bills (see Figure 1) and in the other
block they saw the same hand lying on paper sheets. Within
each block, the background (i.e., money bills or paper
sheets) was always the same. The reason of using a blocked
manipulation instead of a trial-by-trial approach was to
reduce the possibility of carry over effects. Moreover, as
further protection against carry over effects, we introduced
a short break between the two blocks. The order of the
experimental blocks was counterbalanced across partici-
pants and each block consisted of 120 trials. After the
experiment participants were fully debriefed and dismissed.
Imitation-Inhibition Task
Participants had to lift their index or middle finger in
response to a letter (A = lift index finger, B = lift middle
finger) on the computer screen while watching a congruent
or incongruent finger movement (cf. Figure 1). Congruent
and incongruent trials were presented randomly. Each trial
started with the appearance of a picture showing a female
hand mirroring participants’ right hand in resting position
for 500ms. Afterward, a second picture of the model lifting
either the index or middle finger was presented for 2,000
ms or until participants responded. Simultaneously, the
imperative cue (i.e., letter A or B) was displayed between
the model’s index and middle finger. Between trials, the
screen remained blank for 1000 ms.
Data Preparation
To prepare data for analysis, we excluded excessively fast
and slow trials. That is, trials with a reaction time (RT)
faster than 100 ms (0.02%) and trials with a RT slower
than 1,000 ms (0.63%) were excluded (cf. Catmur &
Figure 1. Procedure of a trial in the imitation-inhibition task.
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Heyes, 2011; Cracco, De Coster, Andres, & Brass, 2015).
For the RT analyses, erroneous trials (7.42%) were
excluded as well.
Reliability
In order to test the reliability of the imitation-inhibition task
we assessed the split-half reliability. First, we computed the
congruency effect for even trials and for odd trials and then
computed the Spearman-Brown coefficient. The results
yielded ρ* = .70 for the congruency effect.
Results
Latencies
We hypothesized smaller congruency effects in the money
priming condition as compared to the control condition. To
test this hypothesis, we conducted a 2 (Congruency: con-
gruent trials vs. incongruent trials)  2 (Priming: money
vs. control) ANOVA for repeated measures. The results
yielded a main effect for congruency, F(1, 41) = 128.37,
p < .001, dz = 1.75, indicating that participants responded
faster (measured in ms) in congruent trials (M = 410.68;
SD = 23.97) than in incongruent trials (M = 447.32; SD =
43.85). The main effect for priming was not significant,
F(1, 41) = 0.28, p = .60. More important for our predictions,
however, was the interaction between congruency and
priming, F(1, 41) = 4.09, p = .050, dz = .31, indicating
smaller congruency effects in the money priming condition
(Δ = 32.69; SD = 25.76) than in the control condition (Δ =
40.58; SD = 23.12). The results are depicted in Figure 2.
Additional Analyses
In additional analyses, we first analyzed the error rates of
the imitation-inhibition task with a 2 (Congruency: congru-
ent trials vs. incongruent trials)  2 (Priming: money vs.
control) ANOVA for repeated measures. The ANOVA
yielded a main effect for congruency, F(1, 41) = 32.57, p <
.001, dz = .88, indicating that participants committed more
errors in incongruent trials (M = 8.18%, SD = 5.31) as com-
pared to congruent trials (M = 3.69%, SD = 2.90). Neither
the main effect for priming, nor the interaction between
congruency and priming were significant, F’s(1, 41) < 1.18,
p’s > .284.
Second, in order to test whether there were any order
effects, we ran two (one for latencies and one for error
rates) additional 2 (Block order: control first vs. money first)
 2 (Congruency: congruent trials vs. incongruent trials) 
2 (Priming: money vs. control) mixed ANOVAs with block
order as between-subject factor, and congruency as well
as priming as within-subject factor. When analyzing laten-
cies, neither the interaction between block order and
priming, nor the interaction between block order and con-
gruency, nor the three-way interaction, nor the main effect
for block order was significant, all F’s(1, 40) < 2.5, all
p’s > .12. Likewise, the same effects were not significant
when analyzing the error rates, F’s(1, 40) < 1.38, p’s >
.24. These results suggest that there was no order effect.
Discussion
By assessing the imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al.,
2001, 2000), the results of the pilot study showed a smaller
congruency effect in the money priming condition than in
the control condition, thereby providing support for the
hypothesis that money priming may indeed increase
the focus on the self as compared to others at a basic
perceptual-motor level. These results are in line with Vohs
et al.’s (2008) theoretical account, arguing that money
priming leads individuals to focus more strongly on them-
selves as compared to others. However, a few critical issues
need to be further addressed in order to draw any
conclusions.
First, based on previous research suggesting that people
reminded of money shift into work mentality (Vohs,
2015), one may argue that money priming increased partic-
ipants’ motivation to be good at the task at hand and that
this increase in motivation rather than self-focus drove
our effects. Indeed, motivational theories suggest a strong
link between motivation and cognitive control (Carver &
Scheier, 2001; Kruglanski et al., 2002; Simon, 1967) – a pro-
cess that is involved in the imitation-inhibition task as well.
Thus, one could argue that increased working mentality
may potentially explain the interaction between priming
and congruency. However, it is important to note that a per-
son’s motivation is based on the activation and representa-
tion of specific cognitive and behavioral goals (Kruglanski
et al., 2002). In line with this notion, research has shown
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Figure 2. Latencies for congruent and incongruent trials as a function
of priming in the pilot study. Error bars represent standard errors of
the mean.
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that increased motivation speeds up participants’ reaction
time in various different tasks (e.g., Douglas & Parry,
1983; Obitz, Rhodes, & Creel, 1977; Zink, Pagnoni,
Martin-Skurski, Chappelow, & Berns, 2004). As the goal
in the imitation-inhibition task is to respond as fast as
possible to the target letters on the screen, the increased
working mentality hypothesis would have also predicted a
main effect of priming. That is, the more participants are
motivated to be good in the task, the faster they should
respond to the letters on the screen. As this was not the
case in our experiment, we regard the alternative explana-
tion of increased working mentality as rather unlikely.
Second, it might be that attentional processes triggered
our effect (Bach & Tipper, 2007; Cracco, Bardi, et al.,
2018; Cracco & Brass, 2017). That is, money priming may
have grasped participants’ attention so participants did
not focus on the other person’s hand anymore. However,
we do not regard this alternative explanation as plausible,
because participants’ task was to respond to the letters on
the screen and not to the observed movements. Therefore,
if money would have grasped participants’ attention, one
would also expect slower responses and more errors in
the money condition than in the control condition for both
congruent and incongruent trials. This, however, was not
the case, indicating that the money prime did not grasp
more attention than the control prime. Nevertheless, it
might still be that money distracted participants’ attention
from the hand, but not necessarily from the target letter.
The random assembly of pixels in our control condition
might, thus, not have been the ideal control condition.
Third, our results leave open whether the effects are dri-
ven by (a) reduced interference on incongruent trials, (b)
reduced facilitation on congruent trials, or (c) both (i.e.,
increased self-focus affects both congruent and incongruent
trials to equal extent). A possible way to investigate this
open question would be to add neutral trials, in which the
model’s hand is not moving, into the design. This would
allow computing the interference effect – individuals’ ten-
dency to respond slower to incongruent trials than to neu-
tral trials – as well as the facilitation effect – individuals’
tendency to respond faster to congruent trials than to neu-
tral trials (cf. Brass et al., 2001, 2000).
Fourth, we did not find any effects of the order of prim-
ing conditions. However, this might be due to the small
sample in the pilot study, or because there are no order
effects.
Fifth, recently, it has been suggested that researchers
themselves must provide direct replications of their own
effects in order to deal with the unreliability of a single
study (Cesario, 2014). Due to the natural fluctuation of
p-values in significance testing, every study is prone to
Type I and Type II errors and might therefore yield unreli-
able results (Cumming, 2008). In other words, empirical
findings might reflect empirical artifacts rather than the
underlying truth because the statistical results vary as a
function of measurement error and sampling error (see
Stanley & Spence, 2014). This issue is especially important
in our case, because the p-value of the critical statistical test
in the pilot study was with p = .05 only approaching signif-
icance. The likelihood to obtain a finding that reflects the
underlying truth can be increased through larger sample
sizes and measures with higher reliability. To minimize
measurement error in our pilot study, we already used a
reliable trial-by-trial measure instead of a one-trial behav-
ioral measure. However, it is important to note that despite
decreasing sampling error in our pilot study, our finding
might still be a false-positive. Moreover, although we con-
trolled for color information in the control condition, it
might still be that the money condition guided participants’
attention away from the model’s hand, decreasing the con-
gruency effect. Thus, to cope with these problems and to
get further insight into the question whether the effect is
driven by interference, facilitation, or both, we ran a highly
powered preregistered replication with additional neutral
trials in which the model’s hand was not moving. In addi-
tion, we included order of the priming conditions as a factor
into the preregistered analysis to test for possible order
effects in a large sample. Finally, a meta-analysis was car-
ried out to cross-validate our observed effects. Specifically,
we ran a meta-analysis on all previous, published imitation-
inhibition experiments that used manipulations related to
self-other focus to compare their effect size with the
observed effect size in the money condition.
Preregistered Experiment
Based on the results of the pilot study, we expected smaller
congruency effects in the money priming condition as com-
pared to the control condition. With regard to facilitation
and interference effects we did not have any clear predic-
tion. In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted a highly
powered preregistered experiment. We preregistered the
experiment at the Open Science Framework (OSF; https://
osf.io/ncvfs/?view_only=82162828bf194135b8bb63b483ed
2870) after initial acceptance of the registered report on
Stage 1 of the review process and before data collection.
Method
Participants
In order to estimate the sample size, we conducted a power
analysis using G*Power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &
Buchner, 2007). The power analysis was set up to detect
the smallest effect size of interest, as determined by
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theoretical assumptions and practical limitations (Lakens,
2014). This procedure resulted in an assumed effect size
of d = 0.30, which can be classified following Cohen’s
(1969) rules of thumb as an effect that is slightly larger than
a “small” effect (d = 0.20) but substantially smaller than a
“medium” effect (d = 0.50). Theoretically, this effect size is
consistent with a recent meta-analysis showing that the
effect of social priming on behavior is around d = 0.30
(Weingarten et al., 2016). When using G*Power to esti-
mate the sample size needed to detect effect sizes of
dz = .30 in a dependent samples t-test (two-tailed) with a
power of 1 – β = .95 and an alpha error probability of α =
.05, the resulting sample size is N = 147 participants.
In line with this power analysis, 147 subjects (71 female,
75 male, 1 diverse) with a mean age of 24.13 (SD = 6.84)
participated in the experiment. All subjects were recruited
at the University of Cologne (Germany) and received 5€
in return for their participation. One hundred and thirty-
seven participants were right-handed and 10 participants
were left-handed.
Stimuli and Apparatus
The imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2001, 2000) was
programmed using E-Prime software (Schneider, Eschman,
& Zuccolotto, 2002) and was run on custom-build comput-
ers with 2400 Benq monitors. Although the preregistered
study was very similar to the pilot study, it differed in some
details. First, we used a different device to detect partici-
pants’ responses. As the participant number was rather high
and our laboratory does not have more than two custom-
built response boxes with light sensors, we used Apple key-
boards to detect participants’ responses. Specifically, at the
beginning of each trial, participants were asked to press
down the “G” key with their right index finger and the
“H” key with their right middle finger. In line with the pilot
study, participants were instructed to lift their index finger
in response to the letter A and their middle finger in
response to the letter B. The use of keyboards to measure
automatic-imitation has been validated in many different
studies (e.g., Aicken, Wilson, Williams, & Mon-Williams,
2007; Boyer, Longo, & Bertenthal, 2012; Butler, Ward, &
Ramsey, 2015; Santiesteban, Banissy, Catmur, & Bird,
2015; Sowden, Koehne, Catmur, Dziobek, & Bird, 2015).
Second, we used different stimuli. That is, instead of a
hand that is perceived as clearly female, we used a female
hand that looked more gender-neutral. This is supported
by a pretest in which 54 participants (23 males) with an
age ranging from 18 to 66 (M = 37.04; SD = 11.32) indicated
on 7-point rating scales (1 = not at all to 7 = very much) how
strongly the attributes “feminine” and “masculine” apply to
the hand. A t-test for dependent samples indicated that
participants did not perceive the hand as more feminine
(M = 4.44; SD = 1.53) than masculine (M = 4.07; SD =
1.65), t(53) = 0.99, p = .33. Furthermore, although the back-
ground in themoney condition was similar to the pilot study,
we changed the background in the control priming condi-
tion. Specifically, the model’s hand was placed on a bunch
of different postcards. The stimulus materials in both the
money priming condition and the control condition were
shown in color and were identical in terms of size (444 
286 pixels). In each condition the model’s hand was always
laying on the same background (i.e., same money bills or
same postcards). Figure 3 illustrates the stimulus material.
Third, in order to test whether the effects of the pilot
study were driven by (a) reduced interference on incongru-
ent trials, (b) reduced facilitation on congruent trials, or
(c) both, we added neutral trials into the design, in which
the model’s hand was not lifting any finger. This allowed
us to compute, in addition to the congruency effect, the inter-
ference effect – individuals’ tendency to respond slower to
incongruent trials than to neutral trials – and the facilitation
effect – individuals’ tendency to respond faster to congruent
trials than to neutral trials (cf. Brass et al., 2001, 2000).
Procedure
The procedure was similar to the pilot study. First, partici-
pants signed an informed consent. Second, participants
ran through the imitation-inhibition task. There was no
actual cover story. Instead, participants read specific
instructions about the imitation-inhibition task. That is, they
were instructed to respond as fast and as accurate as possi-
ble to the letters “A” and “B” on the screen (A = lift index
finger, B = lift middle finger). Afterward, participants
Figure 3. Stimuli and procedure of the preregistered study.
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performed two blocks of the imitation-inhibition task. In
one block the observed hand was lying on money bills
and in one block on postcards. Within each block, the back-
ground (i.e., money bills or postcards) was always the same.
In order to get familiar with the task, participants ran
through eight practice trials before each experimental
block. Between the two experimental blocks, participants
were allowed to take a small break. The order of the exper-
imental blocks was counterbalanced across participants and
each block consisted of 120 trials (i.e., 40 congruent trials,
40 neutral trials, and 40 incongruent trials). The total
amount of experimental trials was 240. Finally, participants
indicated basic demographic data – namely gender, age,
and handedness – were fully debriefed by the experimenter
and were then dismissed.
Imitation-Inhibition Task
Participants had to lift their right index or middle finger in
response to a letter (A = lift index finger, B = lift middle
finger) on the computer screen while watching a congruent
finger movement, incongruent finger movement, or no
movement. All trials were presented randomly. Each trial
started with the appearance of a picture showing a
gender-neutral hand mirroring participants’ right hand in
resting position for 500 ms. Afterward, a second picture
of the model lifting either the index finger, lifting the
middle finger, or not lifting any finger was presented for
2000 ms or until participants responded. Simultaneously,
the imperative cue (i.e., letter A or B) was displayed
between the model’s index and middle finger. Between tri-
als, the screen was blank for 1000 ms.
Data Preparation
Exclusion of participants and preparation of the data was
conducted in accordance with the pilot study and the pre-
registration. Responses were detected for all participants
and none of the participants committed errors in more than
one third of the trials. Moreover, none of the participants
had an average response speed that deviated more than
three SDs from the sample mean. In line with the pilot study
and with past research on the same task (e.g., Catmur &
Heyes, 2011; Cracco et al., 2015), we excluded trials with
RT faster than 100 ms (0.4%) and RT slower than 1000
ms (1.0%). For the RT analyses, erroneous trials (5.2%)
were excluded as well.
Reliability
In order to test the reliability of the imitation-inhibition
task we assessed split-half reliability. First, we computed
for even trials and for odd trials the congruency effect
(difference between congruent and incongruent trials),
the interference effect (difference between neutral and
incongruent trials), and the facilitation effect (difference
between congruent and neutral trials), and then com-
puted the Spearman-Brown coefficient. The results yielded
ρ* = .80 for the congruency effect, ρ* = .62 for the interfer-
ence effect, and ρ* = .55 for the facilitation effect.
Results
Preregistered Confirmatory Analyses
Latencies
To test our predictions, we conducted a 2 (Block order:
control first vs. money first)  2 (Congruency: congruent
trials vs. incongruent trials)  2 (Priming: money vs. con-
trol) mixed ANOVA with block order as between-subject
factor, and congruency as well as priming as within-subject
factor (for an overview of means and standard deviations
see Table 1). The results yielded a main effect for congru-
ency, F(1, 145) = 483.97, p < .001, dz = 1.83, indicating
that participants responded faster (in ms) on congruent
trials (M = 467.80; SD = 49.18) than on incongruent trials
(M = 529.54; SD = 61.14). The main effects for priming,
F(1, 145) = 0.29, p = .593, and block order, F(1, 145) =
0.92, p = .340, were not significant.
More important for our predictions, however, was the
significant interaction between congruency and priming,
F(1, 145) = 5.13, p = .025, dz = .19, indicating smaller congru-
ency effects in the money priming condition (Δ = 59.35;
SD = 38.03) than in the control condition (Δ = 64.13;
SD = 39.32). The results are depicted in Figure 4.
Block order did not interact with congruency, F(1, 145) =
0.003, p = .957. However, the two-way interaction between
block order and priming, F(1, 145) = 11.72, p = .001, ηp
2 = .08
as well as the three-way interaction between block order,
congruency and priming was significant, F(1, 145) = 19.76,
p < .001, ηp
2 = .12. Non-preregistered post-hoc analyses
shedding light onto this interaction indicated that when
the control block was assessed first, the congruency effect
was larger in the control condition (Δ = 72.11; SD = 43.58)
than in the money priming condition (Δ = 51.72; SD =
35.83), F(1, 61) = 17.45, p < .001, dz = .53. In contrast, there
was a trend into the opposite direction (Δcontrol = 58.30;
SDcontrol = 35.03; Δmoney = 64.92; SDmoney = 38.83) when
the money block was assessed first, F(1, 84) = 3.07, p =
.083, dz = .19.
Preregistered Explorative Analyses
Error Rates
In a first preregistered explorative analysis we ran the same
analysis for error rates that we conducted for latencies.
A 2 (Block order: control first vs. money first)  2
(Congruency: congruent trials vs. incongruent trials)  2
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(Priming: money vs. control) mixed ANOVA with block
order as between-subject factor, and congruency as well as
priming as within-subject factor yielded a main effect for
congruency F(1, 145) = 158.49, p < .001, dz = 1.05, indicating
that participants made more errors on incongruent trials
(M = 8.73%; SD = 6.76) than on congruent trials (M =
3.05%; SD = 4.16). Neither the main effect of block order,
nor the main effect of priming, nor the interaction between
congruency and block order, nor the interaction between
priming and block order was significant, F’s(1, 145) < 0.57,
p’s > .45.
More important for our hypothesis was the interaction
between congruency and priming, which approached signif-
icance, F(1, 145) = 3.64, p = .058, dz = .16. This indicates
that the congruency effect was tendentially smaller in the
money priming condition (Δ = 5.24; SD = 6.44) as compared
to the control condition (Δ = 6.12; SD = 6.86).
Similar to the analyses of the latencies, the three-way
interaction between block order, congruency and priming
was significant, F(1, 145) = 10.50, p = .001, ηp
2 = .07. Based
on non-preregistered post-hoc analyses, this indicates that
the two-way interaction between congruency and priming
was significant when the control block was assessed first,
F(1, 61) = 13.10, p = .001, dz = .46, but not when the money
block was assessed first, F(1, 84) = 0.97, p = .328.
Cross-Validation With Previous Findings
In order to cross-validate our findings, we descriptively
compared the detected effect size on the latencies in the
preregistered study with the average effect size of all previ-
ously published experiments (i.e., before in principle accep-
tance of this paper – i.e., before March 29, 2018) that used
manipulations related to self-other focus and the imitation-
inhibition task as dependent variable. In a first step we ran
a meta-analysis. Specifically, we included all published
papers (for an overview, see Table 1 in Electronic Supple-
mental Material, ESM 1) in which the imitation-inhibition
task was performed by an adult sample after self-focus
(or related) priming, control priming, or both (Cook & Bird,
2011, 2012; Hogeveen & Obhi, 2011; Leighton et al., 2010;
Spengler et al., 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2013, 2015).
Since research has shown that social priming effects may
reverse when the primes are presented in a third-person
perspective (Wang & Hamilton, 2013, 2015), we did not
include effect sizes obtained with third-person primes. This
procedure resulted in a sample of 10 experiments from
seven studies that could be included in the meta-analysis.
Nine of these experiments used self-focus primes (N =
155) and five experiments used control primes (N = 101).
For three experiments, we were able to extract all rele-
vant information from the paper (Cook & Bird, 2011,
2012; Hogeveen & Obhi, 2011). For another three experi-
ments, we could calculate effect sizes on the basis of the
raw data (Wang & Hamilton, 2013). Finally, the effect sizes
of the final four experiments (Leighton et al., 2010;
Spengler et al., 2010; Wang & Hamilton, 2015) were
extracted from the graphs using a computerized measure-
ment tool. Because four experiments provided multiple
effect sizes from the same sample of participants (e.g.,
within-subject manipulation), we used robust variance
estimation with correlated effects weights and a small sam-
ple correction to account for the fact that these effect sizes
were correlated (Tanner-Smith, Tipton, & Polanin, 2016). A
mixed effects model with a moderator for condition
revealed a significant difference between the congruency
effect after self-focus priming (dz = 0.85) compared with
control priming (dz = 1.43), t(5.37) = 3.75, p = .012 (Figure 5).
However, one could argue that priming in the Wang and
Hamilton studies was less strongly related to self-other
focus than the primes in the other studies. Thus, we also
repeated the meta-analysis without these studies. This
revealed that effect size of the difference between the
self-focus congruency effect (dz = 0.96) and control congru-
ency effect (dz = 1.73) was even larger without than with
these studies, t(2.86) = 7.72, p = .005.
Table 1. Preregistered experiment: Means and standard deviations of
the imitation-inhibition task within the control and the money priming
condition
Control Money priming
M SD M SD
Congruent trials 465.10 48.46 470.49 55.50
Neutral trials 489.16 54.81 493.85 55.48
Incongruent trials 529.23 63.39 529.84 66.70
Congruency effect 64.13 39.32 59.35 38.03
Facilitation effect 24.06 26.69 23.36 26.87
Interference effect 40.07 32.60 35.99 35.14
Note. M = Mean, SD = Standard Deviation.
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Figure 4. Latencies for congruent and incongruent trials as a function
of priming in the preregistered experiment. Error bars represent
standard errors of the mean.
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In the next step, we computed for both, the meta-analysis
and the preregistered experiment, the difference in dz
between the experimental condition and the control condi-
tion. This revealed dz = .58 for the meta-analytic effect and
dz = .19 for the preregistered experiment suggesting that
money priming is less effective in inducing self-focus than
conventional methods used in previous research.
Interference and Facilitation
In order to investigate the role of interference and facilita-
tion in the preregistered experiment, we first computed,
separately for the money and control priming condition,
the interference effect by subtracting the mean value on neu-
tral trials from the mean value on incongruent trials, and
the facilitation effect by subtracting the mean value within
congruent trials from the mean value within neutral trials.
Even though we had no clear hypothesis on whether the
expected interaction effect between priming and congru-
ency should be due to interference, facilitation, or both, this
exploratory analysis aimed at shedding more light onto the
underlying processes of the observed effect. To this end, we
ran for latencies as well as for error rates a 3 (Congruency:
congruent trials vs. neutral trials vs. incongruent trials)  2
(Priming: money vs. control) repeated measure ANOVA.
The ANOVA for latencies yielded a main effect of con-
gruency, F(2, 145) = 382.22, p < .001, dz = 1.62, indicating
that participants responded faster on congruent trials (M
= 467.80; SD = 49.18) than on neutral trials (M = 491.51;
SD = 52.05), and faster on neutral trials than on incongru-
ent trials (M = 529.54; SD = 61.14), t’s(146) > 13.66, p’s <
.001, dz’s > 1.12. Neither the main effect of priming, nor
the interaction between congruency and priming was
significant, F’s < 1.88, p’s > .17. Further preregistered
exploratory t-tests detected no significant difference
between the money priming condition and the control
condition in terms of the interference or facilitation effect,
t’s(146) < 1.14, p’s > .25.
The same ANOVA for error rates found a main effect for
congruency, F(2, 145) = 129.43, p < .001, dz = .94, indicating
that participants made fewer errors on congruent trials (M =
3.05%; SD = 4.16) than on neutral trials (M = 4.04%; SD =
4.11), and fewer errors on neutral trials than on incongruent
trials (M = 8.73%; SD = 6.76), t’s(146) > 4.05, p’s < .001,
dz’s > .33. Neither the main effect of priming, nor the
Figure 5. Forest plot for the relation between the reaction time based congruency effect in the imitation-inhibition task (Brass et al., 2001, 2000)
and self-other focus. Effect sizes are dz.
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interaction between congruency and priming was signifi-
cant, F’s < 2.30, p’s > .12. Further preregistered exploratory
t-tests found a stronger facilitation effect in the control
condition (Δ = 1.58; SD = 4.54) as compared to the money
priming condition (Δ = 0.41; SD = 4.08), t(146) = 2.28, p =
.024, dz = .19. There was no difference in terms of interfer-
ence between the money priming condition and the control
condition, t(146) = 0.47, p = .637.
Non-Preregistered Explorative Bayes
Analyses
The crucial preregistered hypothesis test (i.e., interaction
between priming and congruency) replicated the findings
obtained in the pilot study. To assert the likelihood of our
data under H1 (i.e., money primes lead to smaller congru-
ency effects than control primes) relative to H0, we calcu-
lated Bayes factor using Dienes (cf. Dienes, 2014; Dienes,
Coulton, & Heather, 2018) online calculator (http://www.
lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/bayes_
factor.swf). Specifically, we tested how likely H1 is given the
effect obtained in the pilot study. This required entering the
mean difference between the congruency effect of the con-
trol condition and the money condition (M = 4.78; SE =
2.12). We tested with a halfnormal distribution centered
on 0 and with a SD of 7.89, which corresponds to the mean
difference obtained in the pilot study. This approach
yielded a BF = 5.48 indicating that the data is 5.48 times
more likely to have occurred under H1 than under H0. A
Bayes factor between 3 and 10 is conventionally considered
to be moderate evidence (Jeffreys, 1961).
General Discussion
According to the self-sufficiency hypothesis (Vohs et al.,
2006), people who are reminded of money evaluate
options and actions in terms of personal inputs and outputs.
Consequently, when primed with money, people focus
more strongly on self-related needs and less on the needs
of others (Reutner & Wänke, 2013; Schuler & Wänke,
2016; Vohs et al., 2008). However, several studies (Klein
et al., 2014; Rohrer et al., 2015; Schuler & Wänke, 2016)
could not replicate some of the findings reported in the
money priming literature.
A reason for these inconsistent findings may lay in the
common use of explicit self-report measures. These mea-
sures are prone to demand effects and tend to rely on one
or just a few items, leading to low reliability. Therefore, we
tested the core assumption underlying the self-sufficiency
hypothesis (i.e., money primes lead to an increased focus
on the self; Vohs et al., 2006), with the imitation-inhibition
task (Brass et al., 2001, 2000) – a reliable and unobtrusive
trial-by-trial task, which is sensitive to self-other focus.
Moreover, to strengthen the effect of the manipulation, in
contrast to previous research, we presented the money
primes on each trial.
A pilot study found a smaller congruency effect, and
therefore a stronger focus on the self, in the money priming
condition than in the control condition. A preregistered,
high-powered experiment replicated this effect, suggest-
ing that money primes may indeed increase a focus on
the self. However, due to several limitations, these results
need to be interpreted with caution and call for further
investigations.
First, the results in the preregistered experiment are
strongly influenced by the order of the priming conditions.
Significant effects in the expected direction were detected
only when the control condition was assessed first, but
not when the money priming condition was assessed first.
That is, when the control block was assessed first, the con-
gruency effect was larger in the control condition as com-
pared to the money condition. In contrast, when the
money block was assessed first, there was a nonsignificant
tendency that the congruency effect was larger in the
money priming condition as compared to the control condi-
tion. There are different potential explanations for this
effect. First, it is reasonable to assume that we faced spil-
lover effects. That is, when the money block was assessed
first, the money primes induced a focus on the self which
persisted in the control block working against our predic-
tions. Second, it might be that the money primes induced
a focus on the self, due to contrastive, or comparative pro-
cesses (e.g., Mussweiler, 2003). That is, only when money
primes can be contrasted or compared to another prime
(i.e., the control condition in our experiments), money
primes may induce a focus on the self. Third, one may
argue that over time, participants got better at the task
(cf. Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018), which could have reduced
the congruency effect, and therefore potentially also the
effect of money primes, in the second block. However,
we regard this explanation as rather unlikely, because only
the three-way interaction between block order, congruency,
and priming, but not the two-way interaction between block
order and congruency was significant.
Second, another limitation concerns the way we analyzed
the data. In this respect, it is important to note that the
Critical money priming  Congruency interaction in the
preregistered experiment is significant only when we apply
the preregistered analysis. For example, when removing
block order from the analysis in an exploratory analysis,
the Money priming  Congruency interaction becomes
nonsignificant (platencies = .137; perror rate = .172). This indi-
cates that the results might not be very robust and strongly
rely on the way the data are analyzed.
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Third, even if one would regard our findings as support
for the self-sufficiency hypothesis (Vohs et al., 2006), we
need to acknowledge that the found effects are with dz =
.19 rather small. Indeed, a cross validation with previous
experiments indicates that priming participants with money
produces rather weak self-focus effects as compared to
other manipulations, such as scrambled sentences tasks
(Cook & Bird, 2011; Leighton et al., 2010; Wang & Hamil-
ton, 2013, 2015), word priming tasks (Hogeveen & Obhi,
2011), or mirror manipulations and self-referential tasks
(Spengler et al., 2010). This is in line with Caruso et al.
(2017) who found in three high-powered studies only weak
evidence for the idea that money primes increase a focus
on the self.
Fourth, our results remain inconclusive in regard to the
question of whether money priming increases a focus on
the self due to facilitation or interference. That is, when
computing interference and facilitation effects, we did not
find a significant difference between the money priming
and the control condition in terms of facilitation and inter-
ference. Given that facilitation and interference effects
measure a part of the congruency effect and are therefore
smaller (cf. Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018) and given that the
effect of money priming is rather weak, future research
may increase the number of participants to detect small
effect sizes.
Fifth, one may argue that the found differences between
the money priming and the control condition are due to
attentional processes. That is, it could be that the money
primes grasped participants’ attention so that participants
did not focus on the other person’s hand anymore.
However, we do not regard this alternative explanation as
plausible for different reasons. On the one hand, partici-
pants’ task was to respond to the letters on the screen
and not to the observed movements. Therefore, if money
would have grasped participants’ attention, one would have
expected that participants respond, on average, slower and
with more errors in the money condition than in the control
condition. However, in both experiments, this was not the
case. On the other hand, in the preregistered experiment,
we made sure that the background in the control condition
was similarly attention-grabbing as the background in the
money priming condition. Nevertheless, it could in principle
be that when using other stimuli, the magnitude of the
effect will change. Future research may, thus, use a variety
of different stimuli to cross validate our findings and to test
its generalizability.
Theoretical Implications
Although we found only weak evidence for the idea that
money priming increases a focus on the self, our results
nevertheless have important theoretical implications. First,
our results may explain why previous research had difficul-
ties to replicate earlier work in the field of money priming.
In our research, we used high-powered within-subject
designs, integrated the primes with the stimuli, and
assessed a large number of participants. Despite our effort
to maximize the chance of finding support for the self-
sufficiency hypothesis, we detected in line with previous
research (Caruso et al., 2017) only small effects. And these
small effects could only be detected when specific precon-
ditions (e.g., manipulation of block order) were met. Thus,
it is not surprising that when using less powerful between-
subject designs, applying less reliable measures, and imple-
menting weaker manipulations, it is rather difficult to find
effects of money primes.
Second, our results also have implications for research on
imitation by contributing to the current discussion on the
role of social top-down influences (that are not necessarily
related to self-other focus). Recently, researchers have sug-
gested that imitation may not be as strongly modulated by
certain social top-down influences as previously assumed
(e.g., Cracco, Bardi, et al., 2018; Cracco & Brass, 2019;
Genschow et al., 2017; Ramsey, 2018). In contrast, our
carried out meta-analysis indicates that automatic imitation
can be modulated if the moderators are related to self-other
focus. Moreover, the data of our experiments suggest that
the imitation-inhibition task can be influenced by (social)
top-down modulations when assessing large samples. This
is consistent with the results of a recent study that found
similar effects of social priming on the imitation-inhibition
task in two high-powered experiments (Cracco, Genschow,
et al., 2018).
Electronic Supplementary Material
The electronic supplementary material is available with
the online version of the article at https://doi.org/
10.1027/1618-3169/a000466
ESM 1. Additional table, additional analyses, and
references
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